

Message Text

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 W
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O 231125Z JAN 76

FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2946

INFO AMEMBASSY ATHENS IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE

USMISSION USUN IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY

USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 NICOSIA 0225

EXDIS

BRUSSELS FOR SECRETARY'S PARTY

E. O. 11652: XGDS-1

TAGS: PFOR CY TU GR

SUBJECT: CONVERSATION WITH CLERIDES: RESIGNATION, RESUMPTION OF
NEGOTIATION

REF: NICOSIA 0178, NICOSIA 0169

1. SUMMARY: CLERIDES IS PROFOUNDLY DISTRUSTING OF TURKISH
POST-BRUSSELS FORMULA FOR RESUMED NEGOTIATIONS, AND
MAKARIOS' APPARENT ACCEPTANCE THEREOF. HE REGARDS THIS
AS A CERTAIN CUL-DE-SAC EQUALLY FITTING THE UNVOICED
HESITANCIES AND OPPOSITION OF A WEAK TURKISH GOVERNMENT
AND MAKARIOS TOWARDS A SERIOUS NEGOTIATION. END SUMMARY.

2. I SAW CLERIDES JANUARY 22. HE HAD BEEN UP VERY LATE
THE NIGHT BEFORE DRAFTING HIS LETTER TO MAKARIOS. IN THIS
HE EXPLAINED UNDERLYING CAUSES OF HIS (NOW RESCINDED)
RESIGNATION JANUARY 13. A SUMMARY, NOT THE FULL TEXT,
WOULD GO TO KARAMANLIS. ESSENTIALLY THE CAUSES WERE AS
REPORTED IN SOME OF THE PRESS (MACHI AND CLERIDES' ALITHIA,
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NICOSIA 0177 AND 0166): MAKARIOS' ENCOURAGEMENT OF

POLITICAL HARRASSMENT, RESTRICTIONS ON HIS LATITUDE AS NEGOTIATOR ("HE WANTS ME TO BE A MARIONETTE IN A NEGOTIATION HE INTENDS TO BE MEANINGLESS"), SUBSIDIZATION OF A CRITICAL PRESS, EXTRA-GOVERNMENTAL TELEPHONE TAPPING, TOLERANCE OF LYSSARIDES WHO BLATANTLY SUBSIDIZED BY BY BOTH SYRIA AND LIBYA, PERMISSIVENESS TOWARD FORMATION OF NEW ILLEGAL ARMED GROUPS.

3. FOR ALL THE TURMOIL HE HAD BEEN THROUGH IN PAST TEN DAYS, HOWEVER, CLERIDES WAS IN A RELATIVELY BOUYANT MOOD, COMMENTING THAT OUT OF ALL THIS HE MIGHT GET SOME RELIEF FROM HARASSMENT OF MAKARIOS AND HIS ENTOURAGE, AND PERHAPS A SLIGHT INCREASE IN NEGOTIATING LATITUDE.

4. WE TURNED TO RESUMPTION OF TALKS. CLERIDES SAID THAT IF GOG VERSION OF BRUSSELS AS CONVEYED TO GOC THROUGH TZOUNIS VISIT IMMEDIATELY AFTERWARDS HAD BEEN CORRECT (AND I SAID THAT FROM WHAT I HAVE HEARD FROM OTHERS IT SEEMED APPROXIMATELY SO TO ME), TURKEY WAS TRYING TO TURN BRUSSELS UPSIDE DOWN. A SHORT, PRO FORMA VIENNA AND DEVOLUTION OF SUBSTANCE TO SUBCOMMITTEES WOULD ADVANCE REAL NEGOTIATION NOT AT ALL. THE GREEK CYPRIOTS APPOINTED TO SUBCOMMITTEES (HE MENTIONED PAPADOPOULOS, FORMER JUSTICE MINISTER MRS SOULIOTOU, ATTORNEY GENERAL TORNARITIS AND CHIEF JUSTICE TRIANTAFYLIDIS) WOULD SAY "NIGHT" WHENEVER THE TURKS SAID "DAY" AND IMPASSE WOULD QUICKLY ENSUE.

5. BASED ON SYG SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE DE CUELLAR'S REPORT OF HIS JANUARY 17 TALK WITH MAKARIOS (NICOSIA 0178), I REMARKED THAT MAKARIOS APPEARED ALREADY TO HAVE ACCEPTED ALL OF THE TURKISH FORMULA EXCEPT POSSIBLE THE NICOSIA VENUE FOR SUBCOMMITTEES. CLERIDES, ALTHOUGH OSTENSIBLY UNINFORMED OF MAKARIOS' TALK WITH DE CUELLAR, SAID HE WAS HARDLY SURPRISED: MAKARIOS, LIKE DEMIREL, WANTED AN APPEARANCE OF NEGOTIATION WITHOUT IMPORTANT SUBSTANTIVE ENGAGEMENT. SUBCOMMITTEE CONCEPT WOULD SUIT BOTH VERY WELL. WE SPECULATED ON STUDENT VIOLENCE AND OTHER INTERNAL TURKISH PROBLEMS AFFECTING DEMIREL'S POSITION SINCE BRUSSELS, AND DENKTASH'S CONCERN FOR HIS COMING ELECTIONS

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AS FACTORS INFLUENCING TURKISH POSITION ON NEGOTIATIONS. WE AGREED IN THE END THAT CENTRIFUGAL, SELF-DESTRUCTIVE PENCHANTS OF PARTIES TO CYPRUS PROBLEM HAVE A TENDENCY TO UNDO THE MOYG METICULOUSLY PREPARED, HARD-WON UNDERSTANDINGS IN WHICH IN THIS CASE THE US HAD BEEN A MAJOR INFLUENCE.

6. HALF RESIGNEDLY, HALF HUMOROUSLY, CLERIDES COMMENTED THAT THE

WORLD WOULD COUNT ON ANOTHER UNGA DEBATE IN 1976, ANOTHER BRUSSELS, AND SEVERAL YEARS, AT MINIMUM BEFORE ANY SOLUTION. I COUNTERED BY REMINDING HIM OF ALL THE US HAD PUT INTO THIS, THAT THE IMPORTANT THING WAS TO BEGIN, AND THAT THE LONGER A SOLUTION WAS DELAYED THE MORE NORTHERN CYPRUS WOULD BE ABSORBED INTO TURKEY. CLERIDES AGREED BUT SAID HE FELT ALMOST ALONG AMONG GREEK CYPRIOTS IN SO DOING. MOST THOUGHT THAT TIME, INTERNATIONAL INFLUENCE AND THE ECONOMIC FACTOR WERE ON THEIR SIDE.

7. CLERIDES TOLD ME THAT DE CUELLAR HAD AN APPOINTMENT WITH DENKTASH FOR MORNING JANUARY 23 AND AN IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING ONE WITH HIM. IF, AS SEEMED LIKELY, DENKTASH CONVEYED HIS ACCEPTANCE OF WALDHEIM PROPOSAL FOR VIENNA ON FEBRUARY 17 BUT DE CUELLAR HAD TO QUALIFY THIS BY TURKISH INSISTANCE ON GREEK ACCEPTANCE OF TURKISH FORMULA REGARDING STRUCTURE OF THE NEGOTIATION, HE (CLERIDES) WOULD HAVE TO RESERVE HIS REPLY ON GROUNDS OF NEED TO CONSULT MAKARIOS.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 NICOSIA 0225

EXDIS

BRUSSELS FOR SECRETARY'S PARTY

8. I ASKED CLERIDES WHAT GOC'S PROPOSAL ON TERRITORY

WOULD BE. HE REVIEWED DEBATE ON THIS DURING JANUARY 13 COUNCIL OF MINISTERS/NATIONAL COUNCIL MEETING WHICH SHOWED ABSURB THINKING OF MANY PARTICIPANTS RANGING ALL THE WAY FROM PAPADOPOULOS' INSISTENCE ON CONFRONTING TURKS WITH A TAKE-IT-OR-LEAVE-IT ACCEPTANCE OF UN RESOLUTIONS WITHOUT ANY PROPOSAL ON TERRITORY, TO LYSSARIDES' ARGUMENT FOR A MULTI-CANTONAL SYSTEM INCORPORATING SUBSTANTIAL TURKISH RETURN TO SOUTH. AKEL (COMMUNIST) VOICE HAD BEEN CONSISTENTLY CONSTRUCTIVE. IN THE END, MAKARIOS HAD WON THE DAY WITH PROPOSAL (TO WHICH CLERIDES HAD SUBSCRIBED AS AN OPENING PROPOSITION) FOR "ONE TURKISH AREA AND TWO TURKISH CANTONS" IN THE ZONE PRESENTLY CONTROLLED BY TURKEY. WHEN I ASKED CLERIDES TO SPELL THIS OUT HE SAID THE "AREA" WOULD BE THE KYRENIA-NICOSIA TRIANGLE, AND THE CANTONS ONE AROUND LEFKA AND "ONE FURTHER WEST". (I ASSUMED LATTER TO MEAN SOMETHING IN THE LAIMNITIS/KIKKINA VICINITY.) CLERIDES SAID NO ONE HAD BEGUN TO WORK ON A MAP ALTHOUGHT, ABSURDLY, THE (POLITICAL, PARTY-BASED) NATIONAL COUNCIL

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HAD BEEN CHARGED WITH DOING SO.

9. CLERIDES SAID COUNCIL OF MINISTERS/NATIONAL COUNCIL AGREEMENT ON THE TERRITORIAL PROPOSAL FOR VIENNA HAD AT FIRST INSTRUCTED HIM TO PRESENT THE TURKISH TERRITORY AS LIMITED TO 18 PERCENT OF CYPRUS BUT THIS HAD SEUBSEQUENTLY BEEN UPPED TO 20 PERCENT. IN A LATER PRIVATE CONVERSATION MAKARIOS HAD TOLD HIM TO BE PREPARED TO FALL BACK TO (A) 25 PERCENT (IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAST YEAR'S AGREEMENT WITH KARAMANLIS) AND (B) SOMETHING LESS THAN FULL REFUGEE RETURN.

10. A ASKED CLERIDES HOW MUCH HELP HE EXPECTED FROM KARAMANLIS ON ALLEVIATING MAKARIOS' PRESSURES WHICH HAD CAUSED HIS RESIGNATION AND SEEMING PROBLEMS REGARDING RESUMED NEGOTIATION. HE REPLIED THAT THE MOST CONSTRUCTIVE THING KARAMANLIS COULD DO ACROSS THE BOARD WOULD BE TO REPLACE HIS AMBASSADOR (DOUNTAS) IN NICOSIA. HE WAS SURE KARAMANLIS WAS AWARE OF PROBLEM CAUSED BY SOMEONE WHO WAS A ONE-WAY AMPLIFIER FOR MAKARIOS. I SAID THIS SEEMED WISHFUL THINKING GIVEN DOUNTAS' TIES WITH MAVROS, GREEK "PROGRESSIVE NATIONALISTS", AND PERSONALLY WITH BITSIOS. AS HE HAS SO OFTEN, CLERIDES LAMENTED THE LACK OF A DIRECT COMMUNICATIONS CHANNEL WITH KARAMANLIS EXCEPT FOR RARE PERSONAL VISITS.

11. IN CONCLUDING WE DISCUSSED REACTIONS TO GOG FONMIN UNDER SECRTRY STAVROPOULOS' INTERVIEW WITH A GREEK CYPRIOT WEEKLY PAPER (NICOSIA 0206 AND 0210).

CLERIDES SAID HE THOUGHT STAVROPOULOS HAD BEEN TRYING
TO INTRODUCE A HELPFULLY REALISTIC NOTE BUT HAD BEEN
PUT DOWN BY HIS OWN EMBASSY HERE AND BY THE UNCERTAINTY
OF ATHENS' OFFICIAL REACTION.
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